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Lyons: Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
AND THE ARTIST
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
Prince v. City of New York1
(decided May 31, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department recently held that a mandatory fine of $2,000 imposed
for removing a television antenna, made of recyclable material, from
the top of a residential garbage receptacle violated the Excessive
Fines clause of the New York State2 and Federal Constitutions.3
II.

DISCUSSION OF PRINCE

Petitioner, Albert Prince, a carpenter and sculptor, uses recyclable construction material for art installations.4 On February 23,
2011, Prince removed a television antenna from the top of a garbage
pile consisting of many garbage bags.5 Prince placed the antenna in
his vehicle and drove away.6 Shortly after removing the antenna and
driving away, Prince was pulled-over by a New York City (“NYC”)
Sanitation police officer.7 The officer “issued [Prince] a summons
for unauthorized removal of residential recyclable material using a
motor vehicle.”8 This was a violation of New York Municipal Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

966 N.Y.S.2d 16 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013).
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18
Id.
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§ 16-118(7)(f)(1)(i).9 Subject to the payment of a $2,000 fine,
Prince’s car was impounded, thus limiting his ability to work. 10 That
fine for $2,000 was mandatory and could not be altered by the
courts.11
A.

Procedural Background

One month after the incident, Prince had a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings.12 At that hearing, the Administrative Law Judge sustained
the violation because Prince did not present a valid defense.13 Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that she lacked
discretion to reduce the penalty.14
Prince then appealed to the NYC Environmental Control
Board (“ECB”).15 On appeal, the board was asked to consider
whether or not the mandatory penalty was unconstitutional as an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.16 The ECB concluded that it did not have authority to rule on the constitutional issue.17 Subsequent to that decision,
Prince commenced an Article 78 proceeding against the City of New
York.18 Prince argued that the fine was unconstitutionally excessive
and asked that the fine be vacated.19 The New York State Supreme
Court found no constitutional violations and dismissed the petition.20
Prince then appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department.21
III.

HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FINE’S
CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Before discussing the First Department’s decision in Prince, it

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id. at 19
Id.
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is important to first have an understanding of the United States Supreme Court’s historical analysis relating to the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Fines clause.
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the Excessive Fines clause in the 1989 decision of Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.22 In Browning-Ferris,
the Court held that the Excessive Fines clause would not be used to
overturn a jury’s award of punitive damages in a civil trial.23 The
importance of Browning-Ferris lies not in the decision, but in the fact
that it was the Court’s first articulation of the analysis it would use to
determine whether or not there has been a violation of the Excessive
Fines clause.24
The Browning-Ferris case arises out of a unique set of facts
involving waste-collection and disposal businesses.25 Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. is the operator of a waste collection business.26 In
1973, a Vermont subsidiary of Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.,
(Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.) (“Browning-Ferris”),
entered the Burlington Vermont trash collection market, and in 1976,
offered a roll-off garbage collection service.27 Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
owned by a former Browning-Ferris employee, entered the market as
a direct competitor of Browning-Ferris.28 Kelco, who gained a 43%
market share, threatened the Browning-Ferris business and prompted
Browning-Ferris to use predatory tactics to drive Kelco out of business.29 Kelco sued Browning-Ferris alleging a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act for the attempted monopolization of the roll-off
market in Burlington.30 Additionally, Kelco claimed interference
with contractual relations.31 A jury for the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont found Browning-Ferris liable on all
counts.32 After a trial on damages, the jury rendered a verdict for

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

492 U.S. 257 (1989).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262.
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both compensatory and punitive damages33 and Browning-Ferris subsequently appealed both the judgment of liability and damages to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.34 The Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment and noted that if the Excessive Fines
clause applied to the punitive damage award, the award was not disproportionate enough to be considered excessive.35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question
of whether the punitive damages awarded violated the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines clause.36 The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun,37 held the Excessive Fines clause did not
apply to the award of damages in a civil trial where the government
did not prosecute the action and did not seek a share of the awarded
damages.38
The Court’s decision presented an evaluation of the Eighth
Amendment’s historical development.39 The Court initially noted
that at the time of its adoption, the Eighth Amendment was subject to
little debate because many of the original states had some equivalent
protection against excessive fines.40 The Court found there was no
direct evidence of the meaning of the word “fine.”41 Therefore, the
Court looked at the plain meaning of the term fine, in the context of
its adoption into the amendment, to determine fine meant a payment
to the government as punishment for wrongdoing.42 From this conclusion, the Court held the Excessive Fines clause did not apply to a
punitive damage award in a private civil trial.43 The Court held the
primary purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to protect the people
from the government’s abuse of its prosecutorial power.44
The Court bolstered its finding by pointing to similar language in the English Bill of Rights.45 The Court explained that in the
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264-68.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
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17th century, English judges imposed steep fines on the enemies of
the king, an abuse of power remedied by the protection from Excessive Fines.46 The Court understood the United States Constitution’s
Excessive Fines clause to be a derivative of the English Excessive
Fines clause, which clearly supports the Court’s decision, namely that
the clause is a limit on the ability of the sovereign to use prosecutorial power.47
Thus, the Court limited the application of the Excessive Fines
clause to instances of fines imposed by the government.48
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL EXCESSIVE FINES CASES
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT IN PRINCE

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris, the
Court decided two other cases, discussed below, further expounding
upon the application of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
clause.
A.

Austin v. United States49

In August of 1990, Richard Austin was indicted for violating
South Dakota’s drug laws.50 Austin pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and he was subsequently sentenced
to serve seven years in prison.51 The United States filed an in rem
proceeding to recover Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop, instrumentalities of his crime.52 At trial, Austin contended that forfeiture of the property violated his Eighth Amendment rights.53 Here,
the Supreme Court had to decide whether the civil proceeding requiring forfeiture of property was within the scope of the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.54 The Supreme Court determined that punishments serving punitive and deterrent purposes come

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 267.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267.
Id. at 268.
509 U.S. 602 (1993).
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
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under the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.55 The alternative—a fine serving a remedial purpose—is not protected by the Excessive Fines clause.56 The Supreme Court did not evaluate the claim
any further and provided no guidance for the District Court to determine what constitutes an excessive fine.57
B.

United States v. Bajakajian58

In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court provided a proper framework for an Excessive Fines clause analysis.
In June of 1994, Hosep Bajakajian and his family attempted
to leave the country with over $300,000 in cash.59 When first approached by a customs inspector, who informed Bajakajian of his duty to report all cash in his possession in excess of $10,000, Bajakajian
claimed that he had $8,000 and his wife had $7,000.60 A subsequent
search revealed that Bajakajian was actually in possession of
$357,144 in cash.61
Before trial, Bajakajian pled guilty to willfully transporting
more than $10,000 outside of the United States.62 Therefore, at trial,
the court had to determine whether forfeiture of the total amount of
money was an appropriate sentence.63 After a bench trial, the trial
court found the forfeiture imposed to be a violation of the Excessive
Fines clause.64 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the forfeiture was a per se violation of the Excessive Fines clause and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.65
The Supreme Court first had to determine whether the forfeiture of the currency was remedial or punitive.66 Determining that the
forfeiture was punishment, the Court then had to answer the question
of whether the fine was excessive.67 The Court developed its test for
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 618.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
524 U.S. 321 (1998).
Id. at 324-25.
Id.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 328, 334.
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excessiveness from the cases which interpreted the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause to the Eighth Amendment and settled upon a
test of proportionality.68 The Court compared the punishment to the
gravity of the offense, and if the punishment outweighed that gravity,
the punishment was unconstitutional.69 Ultimately, the Court in
Bajakajian found the forfeiture “grossly disproportionate to the gravity of [the] offense.”70
V.

ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK’S EXCESSIVE FINES
JURISPRUDENCE
A.

County of Nassau v. Canavan71

This New York State Court of Appeals case dealt with the
forfeiture of property which was used as the instrumentality of a
crime—an automobile driven by an intoxicated individual.72 The defendant, Michaele Canavan, was arrested and charged with driving
while intoxicated in her 1995 Saturn automobile.73 As incident to her
crime, Canavan’s car was seized and Nassau County instituted an action for forfeiture pursuant to the County’s Administrative code. 74 In
determining the question of whether the forfeiture violated the state
and federal Excessive Fines Clause, the Court of Appeals followed
the reasoning of Austin and Bajakajian.75 The court first determined
the forfeiture was a punishment.76 Then the court applied the proportionality test.77 The court considered multiple factors in making its
determination as to whether the fine was disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.78 The factors included:
[T]he seriousness of the offense, the severity of the
harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37.
Id at 337.
Id. at 339-40.
802 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
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property and the maximum punishment to which the
defendant could have been subject for the crimes
charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.79
The court ultimately determined that the forfeiture was not disproportionate to the harm caused by the offense of driving while intoxicated.80
VI.

THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S DECISION IN PRINCE
A.

Analysis of Whether the Civil Fine Could be
Considered an Excessive Fine

The City of New York argued that the Excessive Fines clause
jurisprudence was limited to the realm of criminal and not civil cases.81 However the court held that civil penalties are subject to analysis under the Excessive Fines jurisprudence.82 This holding is consistent with the discussion of the Excessive Fines clause in BrowningFerris.83 As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has
held the Excessive Fines clause “does not constrain an award of
money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages
awarded.”84 Though only dicta in Browning-Ferris, the Supreme
Court strongly suggested that the application of the Excessive Fines
clause is not confined to criminal cases.85 Similarly, the Supreme
Court in Austin further elaborated on the principle first enunciated in
Browning-Ferris when it held payments exacted by the government
as punishment clearly subject them to an analysis under the Excessive
Fines clause.86

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id.
Id.
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
Id.
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 263-64.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10.
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Was the Fine A Punishment or Was the Fine
Remedial?

The court in Prince began its Excessive Fines clause evaluation by determining whether or not the fine was more than remedial
compensation for the harm.87 The court correctly determined that the
pertinent question was whether the fine constituted punishment.88
The court followed Austin, noting any purely remedial fine cannot be
said to fall under the Eighth Amendment.89 Continuing to rely on
Austin, the court noted that where a civil fine serves, at least in part,
as a deterrent and is retributive, it is punitive and subject to the Excessive Fines clause.90 The court in Prince did not recount the analysis conducted by the United States Supreme Court in Austin where
the Court described in great detail the history and development of the
Eighth Amendment to explain why there is constitutional protection
from Excessive Fines.91 The court in Prince reviewed the facts and
the legislative history of the pertinent ordinance and determined that
the fine did not have the sole purpose of being remedial.92 The court
looked specifically at the relationship of the fine to the actual loss
sustained by the City as per Bajakajian.93 Noting the legislative history, the court found clear evidence that the fine was intended to be a
deterrent.94 Therefore, the court properly concluded the penalty was
subject to an Eighth Amendment analysis.95
C.

Application of the Proportionality Test

After its initial determination, the court then applied the proportionality test, continuing to apply principles of Bajakajian.96 The
court noted proportionality requires that the amount of the fine must
bear a close relationship to the gravity of the offense that it punish87

Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 21; see Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment and punishment).
92
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
93
Id. (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329) (noting that forfeiture did not serve the remedial
purpose of compensating the government for a loss).
94
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 21-22.
88
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es.97 The court then listed the appropriate factors that courts should
consider in determining gross disproportionality: (1) “seriousness of
the offense”; (2) “severity of the harm caused and the potential harm
had the defendant not been apprehended”; (3) “the maximum fine to
which the defendant could have been subject”; and (4) “the defendant’s economic circumstances.”98 The court determined that the seriousness of the offense was minor; no significant harm was caused by
Prince’s conduct and no potential harm was caused to either the owner of the antenna or anyone else in the area had Prince not been
caught; Prince was subject to maximum punishment for the offense;
Prince had limited economic circumstances—evidenced by the fact
that he could not work without his van; and he was a first time offender.99
VII.

ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACHES
A.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Dissects the Decisions of Austin and
Bajakajian

The first Second Circuit case addressing the Excessive Fines
clause was United States v. Milbrand.100 In Milbrand, the United
States government initiated an action for forfeiture of Marcia
Milbrand’s eighty-five acre property in Pembroke, New York, which
was used for growing marijuana.101
In August of 1990, police searched the property and found
numerous marijuana plants being grown on the property by Marcia’s
son, Mark.102 Mark was charged with and subsequently pled guilty,
in state court, to criminal possession of marijuana.103 The United
States then brought an action for forfeiture of the land used to grow
the marijuana.104 At trial, Milbrand argued that the taking of her
property violated the Excessive Fines clause.105 The district court re97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 22.
Id.
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 843.
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jected the argument without much analysis.106 The Second Circuit
also rejected the Excessive Fines argument, but it provided some
basic tenets for analyzing such a claim.107 The court set forth a factor-based analysis for determining whether the forfeiture of property
was a violation of the Excessive Fines clause.108 It stated:
In our view, the factors to be considered by a court in
determining whether a proposed in rem forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause should include (1) the
harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and value
of the property and the effect of forfeiture on innocent
third parties) in comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence that could be imposed on
the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship
between the property and the offense, including
whether use of the property in the offense was (a) important to the success of the illegal activity, (b) deliberate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous,
and (c) temporally or spatially extensive; and (3) the
role and degree of culpability of the owner of the
property.109
In applying these factors, the Second Circuit determined that the forfeiture was not excessive, and thus, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.110
Building on Milbrand, the Second Circuit next considered the
Excessive Fines clause in United States v. Collado.111 Similar to
Milbrand, the Collado case involved forfeiture of property because of
its use in drug related crimes.112 Sofia Collado and her husband
owned a three story building in Brooklyn, New York.113 The first
floor contained a grocery store, which Collado operated.114 The other
two floors were residential.115 In 1997, law enforcement authorities
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 844.
Id. at 844, 847-48.
Id. at 847-48.
Id.
Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 848.
348 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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uncovered a large-scale narcotics trafficking operation being operated
out of the building by Collado’s son, Ralph Collado, Jr.116 Ralph
Collado, Jr. was arrested and convicted on narcotics charges. 117 The
United States brought a civil forfeiture suit against Collado’s property to which Sofia Collado alleged an Excessive Fines clause violation.118 The district court rejected the argument that the government
taking of the property violated the Excessive Fines clause. 119 In addressing the Excessive Fines violation argument, the district court
held the forfeiture was not “grossly disproportional to the gravity of
the offense.”120 The Second Circuit distilled Bajakajian and enumerated the factors necessary to a proper Excessive Fines analysis:121
(a) the essence of the crime of the respondent and its
relation to other criminal activity, (b) whether the respondent fit into the class of persons for whom the
statute was principally designed, (c) the maximum
sentence and fine that could have been imposed, and
(d) the nature of the harm caused by the respondent’s
conduct.122
After it applied the factors, the Second Circuit determined that there
was no violation of the Excessive Fines clause.123
The final Second Circuit case to consider is von Hofe v. United States.124 In von Hofe, Harold and Kathleen von Hofe argued that
the forfeiture of their home, where they grew marijuana, was an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.125 In 2001, local
police officials and the Drug Enforcement Administration searched
the von Hofes’ home to find multiple marijuana plants and drug paraphernalia.126 The von Hofes were adjudicated under state law, and
the United States subsequently instituted a property forfeiture ac-

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Collado, 348 F.3d at 325.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Collado, 348 F.3d at 328.
Id.
Id.
492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 179.
Id.
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tion.127 The von Hofes challenged the action under the Excessive
Fines clause, and the district court held there was no violation.128
The Second Circuit evaluated the Eighth Amendment claim
on appeal.129 The Second Circuit focused its inquiry by considering
the following:
(1) [T]he harshness, or gross disproportionality, of the
forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense,
giving due regard to (a) the offense committed and its
relation to other criminal activity, (b) whether the
claimant falls within the class of persons for whom the
statute was designed, (c) the punishments available,
and (d) the harm caused by the claimant’s conduct; (2)
the nexus between the property and the criminal offenses, including the deliberate nature of the use and
the temporal and spatial extent of the use; and (3) the
culpability of each claimant.130
Here, the Second Circuit focused on the property aspects of the
case.131 The court ultimately determined that forfeiture of Mr. von
Hofe’s interest in the property did not violate the Excessive Fines
clause because of the extent of his criminal activity.132 Conversely,
the court found that forfeiture of Mrs. von Hofe’s interest was indeed
in violation of the Excessive Fines clause because of her minimal involvement in the criminal activity.133
As per Canavan, the New York Court of Appeals, in evaluating a claim under the Excessive Fines clause will evaluate a specific
set of factors, but these factors are neatly enumerated compared to the
Supreme Court cases.134 New York looks at the severity of the harm
caused and the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the
relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment
to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged,
and the economic circumstances of the defendant.135 It appears that
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id. at 181.
von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 181.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 622.
Id.
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the New York courts borrow heavily from Bajakajian, parsing its decision into a set of elements.136
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOLDING AND CONCLUSION
There are a wide range of punishments that may be considered proportional or not proportionate, thus indicating the need for a
case by case determination. The only clarity we can gain from
Prince and other federal decisions is the appropriate test of an excessive fine.137
The First Department has applied the law analogously to the
applicable federal jurisprudence.138 The case was rightly decided;
however, it is clear that each case raising such an issue will be decided on its own particular set of facts.
Based upon the cases from the United States Supreme Court,
the case from the New York State Court of Appeals, and the Second
Circuit, it is clear that courts do not confront Excessive Fines cases
very often. Clearly the Excessive Fines cases, when decided, are important because there is not much case law to evaluate. Further, it is
apparent that each case will be decided upon its individual facts. The
Prince case stands out because it provides for a structured analysis of
an Excessive Fines claim. The Prince case obviously suggested a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause, but cases of different facts may
not provide such clear facts for adjudication. Ultimately, this case
provides a clear analysis for future courts in New York to follow
when confronted with a case of an alleged violation of the Excessive
Fines clause.
James L. Lyons*

136

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
Id.
138
Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
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